🚲 Supply
Tens of thousands of civilian porters carried rice and shells along jungle tracks, many on bicycles or on their own backs, often at night to avoid French aircraft.
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Unlock This CourseBy 1953 the war had lasted seven years. General Henri Navarre, the French commander, wanted a decisive battle against the Vietminh, the Vietnamese independence movement fighting French rule, and its commander, General Vo Nguyen Giap. In November 1953 French paratroopers landed in the valley of Dien Bien Phu, in the north-west of Vietnam near the border with Laos. France had two aims. First, to block the Vietminh route into Laos, which France had promised to defend. Second, to tempt Giap into attacking a strong camp, where French artillery and aircraft would destroy his army.
Key terms:
The garrison was more than 10,000 men under Colonel Christian de Castries. It held strongpoints on low hills around an airstrip. There was no road, so food, ammunition and reinforcements all came by air. Navarre believed the Vietminh could never drag heavy guns through the mountains or feed an army so far from its bases.
Giap first planned a quick attack. Looking at the French defences, he changed his mind on 26 January 1954 and chose a 'steady attack, steady advance': attack only when victory was certain.
Tens of thousands of civilian porters carried rice and shells along jungle tracks, many on bicycles or on their own backs, often at night to avoid French aircraft.
Vietminh soldiers dragged heavy guns by hand up the hills around the valley and hid them in tunnels, so French planes could not find them.
Trenches crept closer to the French. In the spring rains they turned to mud, which made life harder for both sides.
The Vietminh attacked on 13 March 1954 and quickly captured the strongpoints Beatrice and Gabrielle. By the end of March, shelling had put the airstrip out of use, so supplies could only be parachuted in. Anti-aircraft guns made even that costly, and many parcels landed in Vietminh hands. On 7 May the Vietminh overran the French headquarters and de Castries surrendered, after 55 days. About 10,000 French Union prisoners were taken.
For France: the defeat shocked the French public, who were already tired of the war. In June 1954 the government fell and Pierre Mendes France became prime minister, promising to end the war quickly. France now went to the Geneva talks (the next lesson) in a weak position.
For Vietnam: the Vietminh had shown that an army from a colony could defeat a European colonial power's army in a major battle. Their strength and confidence grew, and the day after the surrender, 8 May, the Geneva discussions on Indochina began. The war did not end that day: fighting went on until the Geneva agreement.
Study Extract C. Extract C suggests that the Vietminh won at Dien Bien Phu mainly because of their own determination and organisation. How far do you agree with this interpretation? Use Extract C, Sources A and B and your own knowledge to explain your answer. [16 marks]
Extract C: From a modern history textbook (a practice extract written for this lesson).
'The Vietminh won at Dien Bien Phu above all through the determination of Giap's army and of the Vietnamese people, who carried supplies and dragged guns over mountains. Yet French errors also helped: Navarre placed his camp in a valley overlooked by hills and relied on an airstrip that shelling soon closed.'
Source A: From a message from President Eisenhower of the USA to RenΓ© Coty, President of France, 7 May 1954.
'The entire free world has been inspired by the heroism and stamina displayed by the gallant garrison at Dien Bien Phu. ... France has in the past suffered temporary defeats, but always she has triumphed in the end ... Those who fought and died and suffered at Dien Bien Phu should know that no sacrifice of theirs has been in vain.'
Source B: From a pamphlet by General Vo Nguyen Giap on the anniversary of the victory, published in English in Hanoi, 1961.
'Dien Bien Phu was the greatest victory scored by the Viet Nam People's Army in the long war of liberation against the aggressive Franco-American imperialists. ... The solidarity of our army and people ... was the decisive factor in our success.'
Extract C argues that the Vietminh won mainly through their own determination and organisation, and there is a great deal of evidence for this. Source B, written by Giap, calls 'the solidarity of our army and people' 'the decisive factor in our success'. My own knowledge supports this. Tens of thousands of porters carried food and shells on bicycles and on their backs, and Vietminh soldiers dragged heavy guns up the hills and hid them in tunnels, so French planes could not find them. Giap also changed to a 'steady attack, steady advance' in January 1954 and attacked only when he was ready.
However, Source B must be used with care. Giap wrote it to mark the anniversary of the victory, so he had a reason to praise his own side, and he says nothing about French weaknesses. Extract C itself admits that 'French errors also helped'. Navarre chose a valley overlooked by hills, so Vietminh guns could fire down on the camp. The camp relied on an airstrip, which shelling closed by the end of March, so the garrison depended on parachuted supplies. Navarre had also wrongly believed the Vietminh could not bring heavy guns to the area or feed an army so far from its bases. These errors left the garrison exposed once the guns opened fire.
Source A gives a different picture. Eisenhower praises the 'heroism and stamina' of the 'gallant garrison' and calls the loss one of France's 'temporary defeats'. This suggests the French fought well, so the defeat was not caused by weak soldiers. Yet Source A does not explain why the French lost, and Eisenhower, an ally of France, had reasons to praise French courage and play down the failure. It also says nothing about the Vietminh.
Overall, I agree with Extract C to a large extent. The French soldiers were brave, so their defeat was not about courage, and the Vietminh's supply effort and hidden guns made victory possible. Judged by which factor was needed for the outcome, the Vietminh's organisation comes first: without the porters and the guns on the hills, even a badly sited camp would not have fallen. French mistakes did make it easier, but they only mattered because Giap and his people were able to take advantage of them.
What lifts it to the top level: it uses the extract, both sources and own knowledge for and against the view, questions the sources' purpose, and ends with a judgement that explains why one factor mattered most.
In a 16-mark interpretation question, give a case for the view and a case against it. Use the extract, Source A, Source B and facts of your own, naming each one and quoting it briefly. Finish with a judgement that says how far you agree and why.