🏡 Why it failed
Peasants were forced to leave their land and family graves, which mattered deeply to them. Many were badly paid or not paid for the move. Corrupt officials kept money meant for the hamlets.
US Policy and Intervention, 1954-64 » Strategic Hamlets, the Fall of Diem and the Gulf of Tonkin
What you'll learn this session
Study time: 30 minutes
Edexcel spec: Paper 2 Section A, Investigation A4, Key topic 2
- How Kennedy and Johnson increased US involvement, and why the Strategic Hamlet Programme failed
- Why Diem was overthrown in 1963, and what the Gulf of Tonkin incident and Resolution of 1964 did
- How to answer a 16-mark 'How far do you agree with this interpretation?' question
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Unlock This CourseAdvisers and the Strategic Hamlet Programme
The USA wanted to stop Communism spreading in South East Asia. Under President Kennedy, who took office in January 1961, it sent more advisers to South Vietnam. These were American military personnel who trained and helped the South Vietnamese army but were not meant to fight the war themselves. By the end of 1963 there were about 16,000 of them, far more than before. The USA also sent helicopters, weapons and money.
Key terms:
- Adviser: a foreign officer or specialist sent to train and guide another country's army.
- Strategic Hamlet Programme: a plan, begun in 1962, to move peasants into fortified villages so that the NLF could not reach them.
- Coup: a sudden, forced removal of a government, usually by the army.
- Gulf of Tonkin Resolution: the 1964 law in which the US Congress backed the President in using force in South East Asia.
The Strategic Hamlet Programme was run by Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, with American support. The idea was to cut the NLF off from the peasants who fed and hid it. Villagers were moved into hamlets protected by fences, ditches and armed guards.
💥 The result
NLF supporters slipped inside the hamlets, and many peasants became more angry with Diem. By late 1963 many hamlets had been abandoned or taken over.
The fall of Diem, 1963
In 1963 protests by Buddhists against Diem's rule spread, and his government answered with force. On 21 August his forces raided Buddhist pagodas. Americans who followed this on television and in the newspapers began to doubt that Diem could ever win the support of his people. Kennedy's government decided that he was a weak ally, and it let South Vietnamese generals know that it would not stand in the way of a change of leader.
On 1 November 1963 the generals carried out a coup. Diem and Nhu were captured and killed the next day. The USA had not planned the killings, but it had helped to create the conditions for the coup. The generals who took over were weak and quarrelled with each other. Governments rose and fell quickly, and the NLF grew stronger. On 22 November 1963, only weeks later, Kennedy was assassinated and Lyndon Johnson became President. Johnson was determined not to be the president who 'lost' Vietnam.
The Gulf of Tonkin, 1964
On 2 August 1964 North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the US destroyer USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of North Vietnam. The Maddox was not badly damaged. On 4 August the USA reported a second attack on its ships. The evidence for this second attack was weak, and doubts later grew that it ever happened. Johnson nonetheless went on television, and ordered air strikes on North Vietnam on 5 August.
On 7 August 1964 Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The House voted 416 to 0, and the Senate 88 to 2. It allowed Johnson to take 'all necessary measures' to repel attacks and prevent further aggression. It gave him wide powers to send US forces to fight without a formal declaration of war. Senator Wayne Morse, one of the two senators who voted against it, warned that it gave the President war powers that belonged to Congress. Johnson later used the Resolution to justify a much bigger war. How he did so is covered in the next lesson, Johnson's War: Escalation, McNamara and Westmoreland.
Common mistakes
- Saying the USA carried out the coup and killed Diem. It encouraged and allowed the coup; South Vietnamese generals carried it out.
- Saying the USA declared war in 1964. Congress passed a Resolution, but there was no declaration of war.
- Writing about the sources without using them. Quote them, and say whether each supports or challenges the extract.
Exam-style question
This question has two real sources from the time and an extract written for this lesson. Study Extract C and Sources A and B.
Extract C
(a practice extract written for this lesson, in the style of a modern history book)
By 1964 American policy had changed. Kennedy's advisers and hamlets had failed to make South Vietnam strong enough to stand alone, and Diem's fall left chaos. The USA now faced a choice between leaving and fighting in earnest. Johnson chose the second, and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave him the power to take over the war.
Source A
From an interview given by President Kennedy to Walter Cronkite on CBS television, 2 September 1963
In the final analysis, it is their war. They are the ones who have to win it or lose it. We can help them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but they have to win it, the people of Viet-Nam, against the Communists. ... I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw.
Source B
From the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, passed by the US Congress, 7 August 1964
... the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
Extract C suggests that by 1964 the USA had moved from helping South Vietnam to taking over the fight. How far do you agree with this interpretation? Use Extract C, Sources A and B and your own knowledge to explain your answer. [16 marks]
Model answer
I partly agree with Extract C, because the USA did move towards taking over the fight, although the change was not as complete by 1964 as the extract suggests.
Extract C is supported by Source B. The Resolution lets the President 'take all necessary measures' and 'prevent further aggression', which is not limited to helping South Vietnam. It gave Johnson the power to fight without a declaration of war. My own knowledge supports this. On 5 August 1964 Johnson ordered air strikes on North Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, and the House and Senate voted for the Resolution by 416 to 0 and 88 to 2. The source comes from the American government itself, so it shows what Washington intended.
Extract C is also supported by the failures that forced the choice. It says advisers and hamlets failed. I know the Strategic Hamlet Programme collapsed because peasants were moved against their will and the NLF slipped inside the hamlets. After the coup of November 1963, the generals who followed Diem quarrelled and the NLF grew stronger, so South Vietnam could not stand alone.
However, Source A challenges the extract. In September 1963 Kennedy says 'it is their war', and that 'they have to win it'. He sees the USA's role as 'help', through equipment and 'advisers', not fighting. He also rejects withdrawal, which shows American commitment. This was before Johnson. By the end of 1963 there were about 16,000 advisers, which fits his words. Also, the Resolution in Source B is about repelling attacks on US forces, and it does not mention sending large ground forces. In 1964 Johnson had not yet sent combat troops, so the extract overstates how far the USA had 'taken over' the war by then.
Overall I agree with the extract only partly. The direction was clear. Failures in South Vietnam and the Tonkin Resolution pushed the USA towards fighting. But in 1964 the USA still described the war as South Vietnam's, and the main American combat role came in 1965. The extract is more accurate about the power Johnson now held than about what he had actually done.
What lifts it to the top level: it uses the extract and both sources with short quotes, adds precise own knowledge, weighs support against challenge, and reaches a judgement justified by the difference between what Johnson could do and what he had done by 1964.
Exam tip
In a 16-mark interpretation question, use the extract, both sources and your own knowledge, and give both sides. Finish with a judgement that says how far you agree and why, by weighing which evidence matters most.
Recap
- Kennedy raised the number of US advisers to about 16,000, and backed the Strategic Hamlet Programme, which failed because it angered peasants and the NLF got inside the hamlets.
- After the Buddhist crisis, the USA lost faith in Diem. Generals overthrew and killed him on 1-2 November 1963.
- The Gulf of Tonkin incident of August 1964 led to air strikes and the Resolution of 7 August, which gave Johnson wide powers.
- For the 16-mark question, weigh evidence that supports the extract against evidence that challenges it.