Confrontation in the Vietnam War, Escalation 1964-68 ยป Johnson's War: Escalation, McNamara and Westmoreland

What you'll learn this session

Study time: 30 minutes

Edexcel spec: Paper 2 Section A, Investigation A4, Key topic 3

  • What kind of war the Second Indochina War was by 1965
  • The roles of Johnson, McNamara and Westmoreland in sending combat troops
  • How the US build-up grew to half a million men
  • Westmoreland's strategy of attrition, and how to cross-refer two real sources

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The nature of the Second Indochina War

The Second Indochina War is the name given to the long conflict in Vietnam after the French left in 1954. By 1965 it was fought on two fronts. In South Vietnam, the Saigon government and its American allies fought the Vietcong (the National Liberation Front's guerrillas, who wanted a Communist Vietnam) and, increasingly, soldiers sent from North Vietnam. In the North, Ho Chi Minh's government in Hanoi backed the fight in the South.

It was a limited war for the USA. President Lyndon Johnson never asked Congress to declare war. He did not invade North Vietnam, because he feared that China or the Soviet Union might join in. The war was also a Cold War struggle: Johnson believed that if South Vietnam fell to Communism, other countries in Asia would follow.

Key terms:

  • Escalation: a step-by-step increase in the size or the violence of a war.
  • Combat troops: soldiers sent to fight the enemy, not just to train or advise another army.
  • Attrition: wearing the enemy down by killing or wounding more of them than they can replace.
  • Body count: the number of enemy dead reported after a battle, used by the US to measure progress.

Three men, three roles

🏛 Lyndon Johnson

President from November 1963. He took the final decisions. He did not want to be the president who 'lost' Vietnam, but he also wanted money for his domestic reforms, so he escalated in stages and tried not to alarm the public.

📊 Robert McNamara

Secretary of Defense. A former businessman, he trusted figures and statistics. He advised Johnson on how many troops and how much equipment to send, and he supported escalation through 1965 and 1966.

🎖 William Westmoreland

The general commanding US forces in Vietnam from 1964. He asked for more men and planned how to use them. Johnson said in 1965 that he would meet the general's needs.

Sending combat troops, 1965

At the start of 1965 there were about 23,000 Americans in Vietnam, mostly advisers. The South Vietnamese army was struggling and the Vietcong controlled large areas of countryside. In March 1965 the first US combat troops, 3,500 Marines, landed at Da Nang to guard an air base. Their job was soon widened to fighting the enemy.

In June 1965 Westmoreland said that the South Vietnamese army could not hold on without large numbers of American soldiers. McNamara backed his request. On 28 July 1965 Johnson announced that the number of US troops would rise from 75,000 to 125,000, with more to follow if they were needed. He also raised the monthly draft call (the call-up of young men for military service) from 17,000 to 35,000. He chose not to call up the reserves, which would have been a very public sign that the country was going to war.

The build-up to half a million

Once combat troops had been sent, each new request seemed to follow from the last. Westmoreland argued that he needed more men to avoid defeat, and Johnson agreed again and again.

  • End of 1964: about 23,000 US troops.
  • End of 1965: about 184,000.
  • End of 1966: about 385,000.
  • End of 1967: about 485,000, with more than half a million in 1968.

The more men the USA committed, the harder it became to withdraw without admitting failure. Each step was meant to be the one that would win the war, but the enemy sent more troops in return.

Westmoreland's strategy of attrition

Westmoreland knew that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese could not be defeated by capturing ground, because they could slip away and return. So he chose attrition. The aim was to use American firepower and mobility to kill enemy fighters faster than North Vietnam could replace them. He hoped to reach a 'crossover point', the moment when enemy losses were greater than the number of new recruits, so that Hanoi would have to give up or negotiate.

The US measured success by body count. This had two weaknesses. Officers under pressure sometimes reported inflated numbers, and the figures said little about whether the people of South Vietnam supported their government. North Vietnam was willing to accept very heavy losses, so attrition did not break its will. How Westmoreland put the strategy into practice is covered in the next lesson, The Jungle War and Search and Destroy.

Common mistakes

  • Saying that Johnson declared war on North Vietnam. He never did. The USA escalated without a declaration of war.
  • Thinking the troops were sent all at once. The build-up came in stages, over several years.
  • Mixing up the roles: Johnson decided, McNamara advised on the numbers, and Westmoreland commanded in Vietnam and asked for the troops.

Exam-style question

Study Sources A and B.

Source A: From a news conference given by President Lyndon Johnson, Washington, 28 July 1965.

'I have asked the Commanding General, General Westmoreland, what more he needs to meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We will meet his needs. I have today ordered to Viet-Nam the Air Mobile Division and certain other forces which will raise our fighting strength from 75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately. Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested.'

Source B: From a memorandum from Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, to President Johnson, 20 July 1965.

'I recommend that the deployment of US ground troops in Vietnam be increased by October to 34 maneuver battalions ... It should be understood that the deployment of more men (an additional perhaps 100,000) may be necessary in early 1966 ... US and South Vietnamese casualties will increase ... the US killed-in-action might be in the vicinity of 500 a month by the end of the year.'

How far does Source A support the evidence of Source B about the sending of US troops to Vietnam in 1965? Explain your answer. [8 marks]

Model answer

Source A supports Source B because both say that more US troops will be sent and that the rises will not stop. Source A says that 'Additional forces will be needed later, and they will be sent as requested', and Source B says that 'an additional perhaps 100,000' men 'may be necessary in early 1966'. Both also show that the decision was about meeting a growing need: Johnson talks of 'mounting aggression', and McNamara recommends that 'US ground troops' be 'increased'.

However, the sources differ in what they tell us. Source B gives a warning that Source A leaves out: it says that 'US and South Vietnamese casualties will increase', with about '500 a month' US dead expected by the end of the year. Source A says nothing about casualties. Source B also looks further ahead, to 'early 1966', while Source A deals with what is happening 'almost immediately'.

Overall, Source A supports Source B to a large extent on the main point, that more troops were being sent and further increases would follow, but only partly on the full picture, because B is open about the cost in lives and A is not.

What lifts it to the top level: it gives both support and difference, backs each with short quotations from both sources, and ends with a judgement on how far A supports B.

Exam tip

Notice who each source is written for. A speech to the public may leave things out that a private memo includes, and this gives you differences to point out. Only compare what the sources say. Quote both every time, and finish with a judgement such as 'to a large extent' or 'only partly'.

Recap

  • The Second Indochina War was a limited war for the USA: no declaration of war, no invasion of the North, and a Cold War aim of stopping Communism spreading.
  • Johnson made the decisions, McNamara advised on the numbers and Westmoreland commanded and asked for the troops.
  • The first combat troops landed in March 1965. In July 1965 Johnson announced a rise from 75,000 to 125,000, and numbers passed half a million in 1968.
  • Westmoreland's strategy was attrition, measured by body count, and North Vietnam kept on fighting despite heavy losses.
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