💪 Support the South
The government of South Vietnam was weak and unstable. The USA hoped that bombing the North would show it was firmly on the South's side and lift morale.
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Unlock This CourseBy early 1965 the USA was sending combat troops to fight in South Vietnam. But the men and supplies that kept the Vietcong (the Communist guerrillas fighting the South Vietnamese government) going came from Communist North Vietnam. President Johnson decided to hit the North from the air.
The campaign began in March 1965, soon after Vietcong attacks on American bases such as Pleiku. It lasted until Johnson ordered it to stop on 31 October 1968. The USA never declared war on the North and never invaded it. Bombing was a way of pressing the North without sending in ground troops.
Key terms:
The government of South Vietnam was weak and unstable. The USA hoped that bombing the North would show it was firmly on the South's side and lift morale.
Bombing roads, bridges and railways would slow the flow of men and weapons down the Ho Chi Minh Trail (the network of jungle routes into the South).
The USA wanted Hanoi to feel enough pain to stop backing the Vietcong and to agree to negotiate.
Johnson and his advisers chose a policy of gradual pressure. Raids began in the south of North Vietnam and moved steadily north. The idea was that Hanoi would see worse to come and give way.
The first targets were bridges, roads, railways, barracks and ammunition stores. Later raids hit oil storage depots (including some near Hanoi and Haiphong in June 1966), power stations and airfields. The Thanh Hoa bridge was attacked many times and still stood.
Some areas were off limits. Johnson did not want to risk bringing China or the USSR into the war, as China had joined the Korean War in 1950. So the centres of Hanoi and Haiphong and a zone near the Chinese border were protected for much of the campaign.
The campaign grew fast. In October 1966 McNamara, the US Secretary of Defense, wrote that attack sorties on the North had risen from about 4,000 a month at the end of 1965 to 12,000 a month. Almost 84,000 had been flown in total. By the end the USA had dropped well over 600,000 tons of bombs on the North.
McNamara worked out that every 1,000 sorties cost about four aircraft, four airmen and $20 million. At 12,000 sorties a month, that is roughly 48 aircraft lost every month (12 x 4). The USA was paying a heavy price for each raid.
The bombing did cause damage. Roads and bridges were wrecked, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (the USA's top military commanders) reported that at least 300,000 North Vietnamese had to be moved from farms and factories to repair work.
But it did not stop the North. By late 1966 McNamara admitted that the bombing had not significantly reduced the flow of men and supplies into the South, or cracked Hanoi's morale. The Joint Chiefs disagreed and wanted more bombing.
North Vietnam had few factories. Most of what the Vietcong needed was small and easy to carry, so there was little to destroy that really mattered.
Crews repaired roads quickly, built bypasses and moved supplies at night. Bombing did not choke the Trail.
The USSR and China sent aid, including SAMs from 1965. American intelligence found that this aid more than made up for the damage.
Gradual raids gave Hanoi time to adapt. The USA also paused the bombing at times, such as over Christmas 1965, but talks did not follow.
Hanoi's leaders were not frightened into giving in. They were determined to unite Vietnam under Communist rule and were willing to accept great losses to do it.
Study Sources A and B.
Source A: From a draft memorandum from Robert McNamara, US Secretary of Defense, to President Johnson, 14 October 1966.
'... our program of bombing the North has exacted a price. ... Nor has the Rolling Thunder program of bombing the North either significantly affected infiltration or cracked the morale of Hanoi. There is agreement in the intelligence community on these facts ... I recommend, as a minimum, against increasing the level of bombing of North Vietnam ...'
Source B: From a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Robert McNamara, 14 October 1966.
'Our restricted air campaign against North Vietnam has destroyed substantial quantities of military supplies ... inflicted major damage on lines of communication, and forced the diversion of at least 300,000 men from agriculture and industry ... [The Joint Chiefs of Staff] believe our air campaign against NVN [North Vietnam] to be an integral and indispensable part of our over-all war effort.'
How far does Source A support the evidence of Source B about the effects of the bombing of North Vietnam? Explain your answer. [8 marks]
Source A supports Source B because both accept that the bombing hurt North Vietnam. Source A says the program 'has exacted a price', and Source B says it 'inflicted major damage on lines of communication' and 'destroyed substantial quantities of military supplies'. Both also treat the bombing as something to carry on with, since A wants it kept at its current level rather than ended.
However, the sources differ on how successful the bombing was. Source A says it has not 'significantly affected infiltration or cracked the morale of Hanoi', while Source B calls the campaign 'an integral and indispensable part of our over-all war effort'. They also differ on what to do next: A recommends 'against increasing the level of bombing', whereas B stresses results such as the '300,000 men' diverted to repairs, which suggests the campaign is working and should not be held back.
Overall, Source A supports Source B only partly. They agree that the bombing caused damage, but they disagree about whether it was working, so A challenges B's view that it was indispensable.
What lifts it to the top level: it cross-refers the two sources with short quotations from each, covers both support and difference, and ends with a judgement on how far A supports B.
Use both sources in every paragraph, with a short quotation from each. A source that agrees on one point can still disagree on another, so say so, and end with a judgement such as 'only partly'.