🏢 Embassies
Ambassadors in East Berlin and GDR ambassadors abroad meant that the GDR could now trade, sign treaties and speak for itself in foreign capitals.
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Unlock This CourseFor its first twenty years the GDR was treated by most Western countries as if it did not properly exist. West Germany refused to deal with any country that recognised the GDR, a rule known as the Hallstein Doctrine, and many states followed its lead. The SED leaders wanted the opposite. If the world accepted the GDR as a normal, independent state, its rule would seem more secure and its leaders more respectable.
Key terms:
Recognition mattered because it was the GDR's best chance to gain trade, loans and prestige.
The turning point came after the agreements between the two German states in the early 1970s, which ended West Germany's attempt to isolate the GDR. Soon many countries felt free to act. Britain and France recognised the GDR in February 1973, and the USA established relations in 1974. By the mid-1970s the GDR had embassies in dozens of countries, and foreign embassies opened in East Berlin.
Ambassadors in East Berlin and GDR ambassadors abroad meant that the GDR could now trade, sign treaties and speak for itself in foreign capitals.
In September 1973 both the GDR and the Federal Republic joined the United Nations. GDR leaders could now speak in the world's main forum, as equals of West Germany.
The change was real, but it had limits. West Germany still did not treat the GDR as a foreign country, and it kept its own aim of German unity.
In August 1975 Honecker went to Helsinki, in Finland, and signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. He sat alongside the leaders of the USA, the Soviet Union and West Germany. The agreement accepted that European borders were fixed, which suited a GDR afraid of change, and it treated all signing states as equals.
It also had a risk for the SED. The Accords included promises to respect human rights, such as the freedom to travel and to meet family. East Germans soon quoted them when they applied to leave, as the GDR had signed its name to them.
A state visit showed that a country was accepted as a full partner. Helmut Schmidt invited Honecker to West Germany in 1981, but Soviet pressure made Honecker postpone the visit several times. It finally took place from 7 to 11 September 1987, after Gorbachev's approval.
Honecker was received in Bonn with most of the honours given to a head of state, including a guard of honour and the playing of the GDR's anthem. He met Chancellor Kohl and other leaders, and the two sides signed agreements on matters such as science, technology and the environment. He also travelled to Saarland, the region where he was born. For Honecker it was the high point of his career.
The visit was not a simple triumph. Kohl made it clear in public that West Germany still hoped for unity, and the speeches were shown on television in both German states.
This is the style of Paper 2 Section A, question (c). Read the two sources and the extract, then answer the question.
Source A: From the joint communiqué issued by Erich Honecker and Helmut Kohl after their talks in Bonn, 8 September 1987 (translated).
'...irrespective of differences of opinion on fundamental questions, including the national question, it is the intention of both states, in the spirit of the Basic Treaty, to develop normal neighborly relations with each other on the basis of equality... both states respect the independence and autonomy of the other in domestic and foreign matters.'
Source B: From an interview with Rupert Scholz, a West Berlin senator, published in the journal Deutschland Archiv, 11 September 1987 (translated).
'...part of that reality is the sovereignty of the GDR, though not in the sense of full recognition under international law. ... the very, very clear words of the chancellor on the unresolved German question, on our unaltered goal of reunification. Honecker had to accept that.'
Extract C (a practice extract written for this lesson, in the style of a modern history book):
'By 1987 the GDR had won what it had always wanted. UN membership, embassies across the world and a red-carpet visit to Bonn showed that it was a respected state. Although West German leaders still spoke of unity, East Berlin had gained recognition and new confidence, and its future seemed secure.'
Extract C suggests that international recognition had made the GDR secure by 1987. How far do you agree with this interpretation? Use Extract C, Sources A and B and your own knowledge to explain your answer. [16 marks]
Extract C argues that recognition gave the GDR a secure position by 1987. There is strong support for this. Source A, a joint communiqué, speaks of 'normal neighborly relations... on the basis of equality' and says that each state respects 'the independence and autonomy of the other', which is how one equal state treats another. Source B agrees that 'the sovereignty of the GDR' was now 'part of that reality'. My own knowledge adds more. Both German states joined the United Nations in 1973, Britain and France recognised the GDR that year, and in 1987 Honecker was received in Bonn with a guard of honour and the GDR's anthem. That was a great gain for a state once shunned by the West.
However, the evidence challenges the idea that the GDR was therefore secure. Source A admits 'differences of opinion on fundamental questions, including the national question', so the two states had not settled whether Germany would stay divided. Source B is more critical. Scholz says the sovereignty was 'not in the sense of full recognition under international law', and that Kohl spoke of 'the unresolved German question' and 'reunification', which Honecker 'had to accept'. Source B comes from a West German politician and may stress this for his own side, but Source A's admission supports it. Recognition also brought dangers: the Helsinki Accords' human rights promises gave East Germans a reason to apply to leave. The GDR also still needed Moscow's permission before Honecker could visit Bonn, and when Gorbachev stopped backing hard-line rulers, recognition could not protect the SED from collapse in 1989-90.
Overall, I agree only in part. Recognition gave the GDR status and confidence that it never had before, so Extract C is right about that. But 'secure' goes too far. Recognition was incomplete, West Germany kept its aim of unity, and the GDR's survival still depended on Moscow and on its people. A fairer judgement is that recognition made the GDR look more secure than it was.
What lifts it to the top level: it weighs both sides using Extract C and both sources, adds precise own knowledge, and reaches a judgement that explains why 'secure' is too strong.
When a source comes from one side (here a West German politician), say what it can and cannot show, then check it against the other source and your own knowledge.