🚪 The CCP
A disciplined party with clear aims, led by Mao Zedong. Its war record gave it credit as the fighter against Japan.
The last lesson, The Civil War, 1946-49, and the Battle of Huai-Hai, told the story of what happened. This lesson explains why. Remember the puzzle: in 1946 the Guomindang had about four million soldiers to the CCP's one million, and still lost.
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Unlock This CourseThe PLA had learned its trade in the war against Japan, using guerrilla warfare and fighting among the people. In the Civil War it avoided battles it might lose, then struck when it was strong, as Lin Biao did in Manchuria. Chiang Kai-shek made costly mistakes. He spread his armies thin and often overruled his generals, ordering cities to be held even when they were cut off, so they could be besieged one by one, as at Changchun.
Morale mattered too. Many Guomindang soldiers were forced recruits, badly fed and badly paid. Whole units defected during the Battle of Huai-Hai, and the PLA grew by taking in captured soldiers and using captured American weapons. Peasant helpers kept the PLA supplied.
A disciplined party with clear aims, led by Mao Zedong. Its war record gave it credit as the fighter against Japan.
Divided into rival groups and full of corruption. Chiang relied on landlords and the wealthy, and ruled with little democracy.
Many Chinese people also remembered that Chiang had spent years fighting the communists, including the attack on the New Fourth Army in 1941, while Japan occupied their country. Officials sent to take over cities from the Japanese in 1945 were accused of grabbing houses and businesses for themselves, which made the government even less popular.
The Guomindang paid for the war by printing money, and the result was hyperinflation. Wages and savings were wiped out. In August 1948 the government brought in a new gold yuan, but it collapsed within months. This hit the city workers and middle classes who had once backed Chiang hardest. In the areas it held, the CCP carried out land reform, sometimes violently. Poor peasants got land and a reason to want a CCP victory.
Most Chinese people were peasants, so their support decided the war. The Red Army kept strict rules, such as paying fairly for what it took, and the CCP won the trust of villagers. The Guomindang seized young men by force for its army. Meanwhile many students and intellectuals, angry at corruption and at government control of ideas, turned away from Chiang, and strikes and protests grew in the cities.
No single reason is enough alone. To weigh them, ask which reasons explain why the weaker side won. Numbers favoured Chiang in 1946, so reasons about support and morale matter more than reasons about weapons.
Look back over the five themes of this study:
What stayed the same? China remained a mainly peasant country, and the question of who could unite it and keep the peasants on side was still the key one.
How far was the support of the peasants the most important reason for the success of the CCP in the years 1934-49? Explain your answer. [16 marks]
You may use the following in your answer:
You must also use information of your own.
Remember: about 86,000 communists set out on the Long March in 1934 and fewer than 10,000 reached Shaanxi in 1935.
Peasant support was very important to the CCP's success, but it was not the only reason. I will argue that it was the most important because it made the other reasons possible.
The CCP gained peasant support by how it behaved. In the war against Japan the Red Army followed strict rules, such as paying fairly for what it took, and protected villages with guerrilla warfare. Land reform then gave poor peasants land taken from landlords, so they wanted the CCP to win. Peasants joined the PLA, and at Huai-Hai millions carried food and ammunition, many pushing wheelbarrows. The Guomindang, by contrast, forced peasants into its army. This support gave the PLA the soldiers and supplies it needed.
However, the Guomindang's own failures also mattered. By 1948 hyperinflation had wiped out savings, because the government printed money to pay for the war, and corruption made things worse. City people who had once backed Chiang lost faith in him, units defected, and Beijing surrendered in January 1949 without a fight. These failures explain why Chiang lost the cities, which peasant support alone cannot explain.
A third reason, not in the bullet points, is military leadership. The CCP survived the Long March, and Mao gained a leading role at the Zunyi Conference. In the Civil War, Lin Biao cut off the Manchurian cities and the PLA captured American weapons, while Chiang spread his armies thin and ordered cities to be held. The Guomindang had four million soldiers to the CCP's one million in 1946, so the CCP must have won through better strategy and morale rather than numbers.
Overall, my test is which reason made the CCP's victory possible, not just Chiang's defeat. A weak government does not automatically lose, and the CCP offered peasants something better. Its military skill relied on peasants who fed, hid and joined its army. So peasant support was the most important, though only because it worked alongside the Guomindang's failure to keep its own supporters.
What lifts this to the top level: it uses a point beyond the bullets, links the reasons together, and reaches a judgement by applying a stated test.
In a "how far" question, state your line of argument in the first sentence and end by ranking the factors against a named test. The two bullets alone cannot reach the top level, so always add a third factor of your own.