The successes: a new industrial power
In little more than a decade the USSR had become a major industrial power. The clearest success was in heavy industry, the main job of the first two Five-Year Plans.
- Coal: about 35 million tonnes in 1928, about 166 million tonnes in 1940.
- Steel: about 4 million tonnes in 1928, about 18 million tonnes in 1940.
- Oil: about 12 million tonnes in 1928, about 31 million tonnes in 1940.
- Electricity: almost ten times as much was made in 1940 as in 1928.
So coal and steel output more than quadrupled in twelve years, and oil more than doubled. By most estimates, by 1940 only the USA produced more industrial goods than the USSR. This growth came while the capitalist countries were stuck in the Great Depression, with millions out of work. In the USSR, the unemployment of the NEP years had gone by the early 1930s, because the new mines and factories needed every worker they could get. Communists at home and abroad used this as proof that planning worked.
Key terms:
- Consumer goods: things people buy for their own use, such as clothes, shoes and furniture.
- Light industry: factories that make consumer goods, as opposed to coal, steel and machines.
- Urbanisation: the growth of towns and cities as people move in from the countryside.
- Real wages: what a worker's pay can actually buy once prices are taken into account.
New cities and a stronger defence industry
🏢 New cities
Industry pulled millions of peasants into the towns. The number of people living in towns and cities rose from about 26 million in 1926 to about 56 million in 1939. Moscow's population roughly doubled, to more than 4 million. Whole new cities appeared, not only Magnitogorsk. Komsomolsk-on-Amur, in the Far East, was founded in 1932 and named after the Komsomol, the Communist youth league, whose volunteers helped to build it. This rapid urbanisation turned a country of peasants into one with a huge industrial workforce.
💪 Stronger defence
Steel, oil and engineering works made modern weapons possible. Soviet factories were now turning out tanks, aircraft and guns in large numbers. By June 1941 the Red Army had more than 20,000 tanks, more than any other army in the world, and the new T-34 tank had gone into production in 1940. In 1928 the USSR could not have fought a modern war. By 1941 it had the industry to do so. How that industry was used after the German invasion is covered in Stalingrad and Soviet Survival.
The failures: what the figures hid
The Plans rewarded one thing above all: hitting the target for quantity. That caused serious problems.
📉 Poor quality
A factory was judged on how much it made, not how well. Goods were rushed out to meet the target, so many were badly made and some could not be used at all. Many of the new workers were peasants who had never seen a machine before. With little training, they often broke expensive equipment.
📝 False figures
Remember, a manager who missed his target could be accused of wrecking. So managers lied. They reported output that had never been made, and officials above them passed the numbers on. The government exaggerated too. The first plan was declared a triumph, yet it had asked for 75 million tonnes of coal and got about 64 million, and for about 10 million tonnes of steel and got about 6 million.
📦 Waste
Planning a whole economy from Moscow was clumsy. Materials were sent to the wrong place or arrived late, so factories stood idle waiting for parts. Managers hoarded supplies in case of shortages. Some showpiece projects were poor value. The White Sea-Baltic Canal, opened in 1933 and dug by prisoners with hand tools, was too shallow for large ships.
🛒 Shortages of consumer goods
Money, materials and workers went to heavy industry and arms, so light industry was starved. The second plan's promise of more consumer goods was not kept. Clothes, shoes and household goods were scarce, and queues were part of daily life. Bread was rationed in the towns from 1929 until 1935. By most estimates, real wages were lower in 1937 than in 1928.
Growth also slowed in the late 1930s. Steel output barely rose between 1937 and 1940. One reason was the purges, which removed many experienced managers, engineers and planners. You will study these in The Murder of Kirov and the Reasons for the Purges.
The human cost
Industrialisation was paid for by the people who carried it out. Building sites and mines were dangerous, safety was ignored in the rush to meet targets, and many workers were killed or injured. Hours were long and discipline grew harsher. In 1940 being absent from work, or leaving a job without permission, became a crime. Much of the hardest work, on canals, railways and in remote mines, was done by prisoners, and many of them died. Their story is told in Yezhov, the NKVD and the Gulags. Daily life in the crowded new cities is covered in Living and Working Conditions in Town and Countryside.
Success or failure? Reaching a judgement
The answer depends on the test you use.
- Judged by Stalin's own aims, industrialisation was a success. He wanted heavy industry and the power to fight a modern war, and by 1941 the USSR had both.
- Judged by the lives of ordinary people, it was largely a failure by 1941. They worked harder, had less to buy, and paid a heavy price in suffering.
- Judged by efficiency, the record is mixed. Output rose enormously, but with waste, poor quality and figures nobody could fully trust.
Official Soviet figures must be handled with care. Even so, historians agree that the growth in heavy industry was real and very large.
Common mistakes
Don't write that the Plans 'met all their targets'. The first plan missed its coal and steel targets, even though output rose sharply. Missing a target is not the same as failing: the targets were set far too high on purpose. Don't describe only successes or only failures. And don't forget the date in the question. 'By 1941' means you should stop before the war, not write about wartime production.
Exam-style question
Extract A (a practice extract written for this lesson, in the style of a modern history textbook)
Stalin's planners boasted of record output, but their figures hid a grim reality. Terrified managers simply lied about what their factories had made. Much of what was produced was too shoddy to use, and costly machines were ruined by untrained hands. Materials lay rusting in railway yards while families queued for hours for bread and shoes. The new cities rose on the backs of exhausted, hungry workers. The Plans delivered impressive statistics, but precious little that ordinary people could use.
(a) What impression does the author give about the results of industrialisation in the USSR?
You must use Extract A to explain your answer. [6 marks]
Model answer
The author gives the impression that industrialisation was a hollow achievement, which looked good on paper but failed in reality. The language attacks the official story: the planners 'boasted', their figures 'hid a grim reality' and managers 'simply lied', which suggests the successes cannot be trusted. The words chosen for what was made are scornful, such as 'shoddy' and 'ruined', and the image of materials 'rusting in railway yards' stresses waste. The author also builds sympathy for the people, describing 'exhausted, hungry workers' and families who 'queued for hours'. The extract ends by dismissing the Plans as 'impressive statistics, but precious little' else. The author has chosen to write only about lies, waste and suffering. Nothing is said about the huge rise in coal and steel output or the stronger defence industry, so the reader is left with a picture of failure.
What lifts this to the top level: it names one clear impression, proves it with short quotations about the author's choice of words, and explains what the author stressed and what was left out.
Exam tip
Look at the last sentence of an extract first. Authors often sum up their view there, as this one does with 'precious little that ordinary people could use'. Then ask what is missing. Here, your knowledge of the growth in heavy industry helps you to show that the author has selected only the failures.